9/16: Crito to the end, Meno 87c-89e (reply)
- Course
- PHIL 3110 Plato, fall 2024
- Date
- 17 September 2024
- Type
- Seminar post
I agree with a classmate's interpretation that virtuous actions do not need to benefit the doer of the actions directly but should still be beneficial to someone or something. Socrates' argument in Crito (50a-54e) supports this view. While fleeing with his friends from Athens would save his life and benefit him personally, Socrates argues that it would cause harm to the society that shaped him and the laws that it stands for. This suggests that for Socrates, virtue is not confined to personal gain but more rooted in the higher values and principles he holds. This is shown in Crito 46c, where he claims that he values and respects the same principles as before. In Meno, while he acknowledges that virtue can benefit an individual, he suggests that virtuous actions benefit the entire community and his decision to abide by the laws, despite his personal cost reinforces the idea of a greater good.
I also believe that in alignment with the argument in Euthyphro - where it is established that the gods do not have needs that humans can fulfill virtuous actions do not necessarily benefit the gods. One could stay that it is what is pleasing to the Gods, but that places us back in the loop of Euthyphro's argument that we have been discussing over the past few weeks. Instead I think that focusing on the benefit of something larger than oneself fits best as it still allows for self fulfilling actions to remain virtuous as long as they benefit the community (e.g. building a succesful business).
In conclusion, this view of virtue I think goes beyond personal benefits and instead is focused on the wider community. In relation to gods, I do not think that something needs to be liked by the Gods in order to be virtuous as that would reintroduce the aspect of Euthyphros argument where some gods might like certain actions that others don't. This point also brings up an important angle when addressing what is societally beneficial. It would be silly to assume that societies are able to agree on what is beneficial to the community in all cases, so does this definition of virtuous not have the same holes that the definition of piety did at the beginning of Euthyphro.