Plato and Aristotle: Seminar Notes

Virtue, and who it benefits (Crito, Meno)

I agree with a classmate's interpretation that virtuous actions do not need to benefit the doer of the actions directly but should still be beneficial to someone or something. Socrates' argument in Crito (50a-54e) supports this view. While fleeing with his friends from Athens would save his life and benefit him personally, Socrates argues that it would cause harm to the society that shaped him and the laws that it stands for. This suggests that for Socrates, virtue is not confined to personal gain but more rooted in the higher values and principles he holds. This is shown in Crito 46c, where he claims that he values and respects the same principles as before. In Meno, while he acknowledges that virtue can benefit an individual, he suggests that virtuous actions benefit the entire community and his decision to abide by the laws, despite his personal cost reinforces the idea of a greater good.

I also believe that in alignment with the argument in Euthyphro - where it is established that the gods do not have needs that humans can fulfill - virtuous actions do not necessarily benefit the gods. One could say that it is what is pleasing to the Gods, but that places us back in the loop of Euthyphro's argument that we have been discussing over the past few weeks. Instead I think that focusing on the benefit of something larger than oneself fits best as it still allows for self fulfilling actions to remain virtuous as long as they benefit the community (e.g. building a successful business).

In conclusion, this view of virtue I think goes beyond personal benefits and instead is focused on the wider community. In relation to gods, I do not think that something needs to be liked by the Gods in order to be virtuous as that would reintroduce the aspect of Euthyphro's argument where some gods might like certain actions that others don't. This point also brings up an important angle when addressing what is societally beneficial. It would be silly to assume that societies are able to agree on what is beneficial to the community in all cases, so does this definition of virtuous not have the same holes that the definition of piety did at the beginning of Euthyphro?

What counts as an account of knowledge (Theaetetus)

Socrates critiques the definition of knowledge as “true belief with an account” (logos). He raises issues about what constitutes a satisfactory account, including concerns of circularity and the challenge of defining logos itself. Do you think Socrates’ critique undermines the idea that justification can elevate true belief to knowledge, or does it simply highlight the complexity of articulating justification? Furthermore, given the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue, how should we interpret the role of Socrates’ elenctic method in the pursuit of knowledge: does it suggest that knowledge itself might be unattainable, or that its nature is fundamentally relational rather than definitional?

Aristotle on non-being (Metaphysics Γ 1-3)

Aristotle's move from studying being qua to also including the study of its opposites does seem fast, but it reflects his broader claim that science investigates opposites as part of understanding their primary subjects and that if metaphysics investigates being, it must also account for non being in some way. This raises a serious question though --> What is the status of non being for Aristotle?

It does not seem like non being can be a proper object in its own right. If it truly isn't there's nothing there to study. Still, Aristotle insists that contraries like plurality/unity, sameness/difference and even contradiction fall within the bounds of this inquiry. This implies that being is not an univocal or simple idea but one that shows up in different categories and with different kinds of rebuttals. The problem comes when Aristotle treats one as equivalent to being and then takes some plurality as its opposite this assumes that the one has the same ontological weight as being itself --> still not obvious that one = being nor that their opposites correlate in the same way.

Is Aristotle's metaphysics obligated to explain non-being in the same way it explains plurality and other contraries? If being admits of contraries like inequality/dissimilarity are these reducible to being vs non being or are they fundamentally different axes of opposition? Questions like this push us to make it clear whether Aristotle thinks being is a genus with logical opposites or something more foundational that structures how all oppositions can be possible.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics Γ 7-8)

In chapters 7 & 8, Aristotle defends the Principle of Non-Contradiction as the strongest and most fundamental principle of all. He says it can't be demonstrated because demonstration already presupposes it, but also insists that it's not possible to meaningfully deny it. Someone who tries to reject this principle can still be disproved by being shown to contradict themselves in speech & the way they live.

This seems to me like a strong claim. Aristotle appears to be saying that denying the PNC isn't just wrong, but unintelligible. If all we can do is show that someone contradicts themselves when they deny it isn't that just assuming the principle in order to defend it? If that is the case is it actually being defended, or just asserted in a different form?

Also the move to say that even people who say they reject it still live as though it's true seems to shift the ground a bit. Is that a fair way to settle a metaphysical disagreement? Should metaphysics rely on how people act rather than on what they can consistently argue?