Functionalism and Block's China Brain

The assignment's question: 1. Defend functionalism from Block’s China Brain thought experiment. (Don’t get bogged down in all the different varieties of functionalism; just give a quick definition of little-f ‘functionalism.’) You must entertain at least two replies, evaluate them, and then defend the one you think most successful. Tell us which side you think wins the debate and why. (See ‘How Philosophers Deal with Objections,’ under Files in Canvas.)

In this essay, I argue that functionalism (the idea that mental states are characterized by their functional roles within cognitive systems), is not swayed by the scrutiny posed in Block’s China Brain thought experiment. Drawing from the writings in the book (Chalmers, David, ed. 2021. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd edition), I will show how functionalism's core tenets remain unbeatable by such thought experiments. I also will present and critically evaluate two distinct replies to this defense, and explain why functionalism, when applied correctly successfully counters the objection and retains its validity within the realm of philosophy of mind.

Functionalism means that the internal, physical, or chemical makeup does not characterize mental states but instead the mental state’s functional role does. Therefore, a mental state is defined by what it does within the system of states and how it interacts with other inputs and outputs and also other states. Block’s China Brain thought experiment is an interesting critique of this view. It asks whether a setup, where each citizen in China is coordinated to simulate the firing of neurons, could result in a ‘brain’ that is able to process consciousness despite not having the physical or biological unity that would be typically seen in a single organism’s brain. This challenges functionalism by probing whether systemic functionality is indeed sufficient for consciousness or whether it is more complex than that. Whether the complex and nuanced nature of mental processes can arise independently of a conventional physical brain is at the centre of his point: on his view, sameness of brain process or of mental process cannot be captured simply by an isomorphism between the total possible states of two systems.

When examining functionalism, two main replies emerge to me in response to Block’s thought experiment. The first is from Smart’s perspective and suggests that while the functional roles of mental states are crucial, they cannot be wholly separated from the physical substrate in which they are based. He continues that neuroscientific evidence reveals that there is a tight connection and entanglement between mental states and physical brain states, implying that even if mental states can be defined just by their function, this function is usually based in the physical structure needed to do these activities. This view acknowledges the significance of functional roles but seems to bend towards more of a type-identity theory. Type identity theory holds that each brain and mental state is identical. The challenge here comes from Smart limiting the scope of functionalism to current neuroscientific models of the brain. This could undermine the theories broader and future application.

The other reply that stands out to me is Putnam’s concept of multiple realizability as it expands upon the functionalist framework to account for the realization, Putnam's claim is that types of mental states are not reducible to types of physical states. Due to this, mental states could be realized in any number of ways, including in the case of the vast network of a Chinese nation. This reply more closely follows the idea of functionalism by allowing the mental to exist beyond what is traditionally understood with brain states. What it gets wrong I think however is that it faces the counterargument of that a collective human goal could be the same as a singular conscious entity. Could functional roles spread across that many individuals actually form a single conscious mind when combined? This reply maintains that consciousness is not an inherent property of the brain but comes from a complex system executing functions and does not depend on the substrate.

In conclusion, the most effective reply in my opinion is the one that follows Putnam's principle of multiple realizability. This principle frees functionalism from the constraints of a singular, neurocentric interpretation, still maintaining that mental states are characterized not by their physical makeup but by their casual roles. The other reply,from Smart, risks conflating functionalism with type-identity theory. Although this approach provides valuable insights into the relationship between brain states and mental states it doesn’t account for mental state instantiation beyond the traditional neurobiological context and our understanding of the brain. Therefore it is in my opinion multiple realizability that upholds in the face of Block’s thought experiment and when functionalism is seen in this way, it offers a compelling and adaptable framework that encompasses more of the plurality of functionalism.

Bibliography:

• Chalmers, David, ed. 2021. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd edition